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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a set theoretic approach for knowledge representa-
tion. While the syntax of an application domain is captured by set theoretic con-
structs including individuals, concepts and operators, knowledge is formalized by
equality assertions. We first present a primitive form that uses minimal assumed
knowledge and constructs. Then, assuming naive set theory, we extend it by def-
initions, which are special kinds of knowledge. Interestingly, we show that the
primitive form is expressive enough to define logic operators, not only proposi-
tional connectives but also quantifiers.
1 Introduction
Knowledge representation and reasoning (KR) is one of the central focuses of Artificial
Intelligence (AI) [Baral, 2003; Brachman and Levesque, 2004; van Harmelen et al., 2008].
KR intends to syntactically formalize information in an application domain as knowl-
edge. Then, complex problems in the domain can be solved by reasoning about the
knowledge. KR is not only of its own interests but also highly influential to many other
subfields in AI, including expert systems, multi-agent systems, planning, uncertainty,
cognitive robotics and semantic Web [Brachman and Levesque, 2004; van Harmelen et al., 2008].
Nevertheless, KR has encountered huge difficulties. One issue is that there are too
many features and building blocks to be considered [van Harmelen et al., 2008], for in-
stance, propositions, variables, connectives, rules, actions, common sense, time/space,
uncertainty, mental states and so on. In fact, KR has made huge successes on formaliz-
ing these building blocks separately. However, combing them together, even several of
them, seems an extremely difficult task. On the other side, many application domains,
e.g. robotics, need multiple building blocks at the same time.
Another critical related issue is about the balance between expressiveness and ef-
ficiency. It is widely believe that the more expressive, the less efficient, and vice
versa [Levesque and Brachman, 1987]. However, in many application domains, e.g.,
robotics, we need both. Yet this is a very difficult task for KR formalisms. Consider
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propositional logic, a fundamental KR formalism that only takes propositions and nat-
ural propositional connectives into account. The inference problem is coNP complete,
which means that, most likely, it takes exponential time in worst case.
Against this backdrop, we argue that KR needs a simple, extensible, expressive and
efficient approach. “Extensible” means that this approach should allow a current sys-
tem in it to be easily extended with more building blocks. “Expressive” means that this
approach should be able to represent different types of knowledge for a given set of
building blocks.“Efficient” means that this approach can efficiently reason about and
derive new knowledge in order to solve problems. Nevertheless, “simple” is an am-
biguous term, which can be further elaborated into three aspects: primitive — using
minimal primitive constructs, succinct – able to represent knowledge in various appli-
cation domains with relatively small knowledge bases and user-friendly — easy to be
understood and used by knowledge engineers.
Towards this goal, we propose a set theoretic knowledge representation approach
for syntactically representing knowledge in application domains. While the syntax
of an application domain is captured by a set of individuals, concepts and operators,
knowledge is simply formalized by equality assertions of the form a = b, where a and
b are either atomic individuals or compound individuals. Semantically, individuals,
concepts and operators are interpreted as elements, sets and functions respectively in
naive set theory and knowledge of the form a = b means that the two individuals a and
b are referring to the same element.
We separate representation and reasoning. This paper is mainly concerned with
the basic ideas and the representation part, and we leave the reasoning part to another
paper. In this paper, we first present the primitive form that uses minimal assumed
knowledge and primitive constructs. Then, assuming naive set theory, we extend it
with more building blocks by definitions that use assertions to define new syntactic
objects, including individuals, concepts and operators. Once these new objects are
defined, they can be used as a basis to define more. As an example, we show that we
can define multi-assertions by using Cartesian product, and nested assertions by using
multi-assertions. Interestingly, we show that this method, i.e., extending the primitive
form by definitions based on native set theory, is powerful enough to syntactically
capture logic operators, including both propositional connectives and quantifiers.
2 The Primitive Form
In this section, we present the primitive form of our set theoretic knowledge repre-
sentation approach. As the goal is to syntactically represent knowledge in application
domains, there are two essential tasks, i.e., how to capture the syntax of the domain
and how to represent knowledge in it.
We assume naive set theory [Halmos, 1960], including the basic concepts such as
elements, sets and functions, Cartesian product, the built-in relationships ∈ and ⊆, the
built-in operators ∪, ∩ and \, the Boolean set {⊤,⊥} and the set N of natural numbers,
cardinality and set specifications.
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2.1 Capturing the syntax
Given an application domain, a syntactic structure (structure for short if clear from the
context) of the domain is a triple 〈I, C,O〉, where I is a collection of individuals, rep-
resenting objects in the domain, C ⊆ 2I a collection of concepts, representing groups
of objects sharing something in common and O a collection of operators, representing
relationships and connections among individuals and concepts.
Concepts and operators can be considered as individuals as well. If needed, we can
have concepts of concepts, concepts of operators, concepts of concepts of operators
and so on.
An operator could be multi-ary, that is, it maps a tuple of individuals into a sin-
gle individual.1 Each multi-ary operator O is associated with a domain of the form
(C1, . . . , Cn), representing all possible values that the operator O can operate on,
where Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a concept. We call n the arity of O. For a tuple (a1, . . . , an)
matching the domain of an operator O, i.e., ai ∈ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, O maps (a1, . . . , an)
into an individual, denoted by O(a1, . . . , an). We also use O(C1, . . . , Cn) to denote
the set {O(a1, . . . , an) | ai ∈ Ci}, called the range of the operator O.
Operators are similar to functions in first-order logic but differs in two essential
ways. First, operators are many-sorted as C1, . . . , Cn could be different concepts.
More importantly,C1, . . . , Cn could be high-order constructs, e.g., assertions, concepts
of concepts, concepts of operators and so on.
For instance, consider the arithmetic domain, in which 0, 1, 2, etc., are individuals;
the set N of natural numbers is a concept; the successor operator Succ and the add
operators Add are operators.
For convenience, if O is unary, we sometimes use a.O (C.O) to denote O(a)
(O(C)), where a ∈ I and C ∈ C. If O is binary, we sometimes use a O b (AO B) to
denote O(a, b) (O(A,B)), where a, b ∈ I and A,B ∈ C. If the range of an operator O
is Boolean, we sometimes use O(a1, . . . , an) to denote O(a1, . . . , an) = ⊤.
2.2 Representing knowledge
Let 〈I, C,O〉 be a syntactic structure. A term is an individual, either an atomic individ-
ual a ∈ I or the result O(a1, . . . , an) of an operator O operating on some individuals
a1, . . . , an. We also call the latter compound individuals.
An assertion is of the form
a = b, (1)
where a and b are two terms. Intuitively, an assertion of the form (1) is a piece of
knowledge in the application domain, claiming that the left and right side are referring
to the same objects. Here, = is the the built-in equality relation in naive set theory.
Hence, a = b can be understood in alternative way that = (a, b) is true. A knowledge
base is a set of assertions. Terms and assertions can be considered as individuals as
well.
For instance, in arithmetic, 0 = Succ(1) and 2 + 3 = 5 are two typical assertions.
1Note that in naive set theory, a tuple of sets is a Cartesian product of some sets, which itself is a set as
well. Therefore, multi-ary operators can essentially be viewed as single-ary.
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Similar to concepts that group individuals, we use schemas to group terms and
assertions. A schema term is either an atomic concept C ∈ C or the collection of
results O(C1, . . . , Cn). Essentially, a schema term represents a set of terms, in which
every concept is grounded by a corresponding individual. Then, a schema assertion
is of the same form as form (1) except that terms can be replaced by schema terms.
Similarly, a schema assertion represents a set of assertions.
Note that it could be the case that two or more different individuals are referring
to the same concept C in schema terms and assertions. In this case, we need to use
different copies ofC, denoted by C1, C2, . . . , to distinguish among them. For instance,
all assertions x = y, where x and y are numbers, are captured by the schema assertion
N
1 = N2. On the other side, in a schema, the same copy of a concept C can only refer
to the same individual. For instance, N = N is the set of all assertions of the form
x = x, where x ∈ N.
2.3 The semantics
We introduce a set theoretic semantics to define the meanings of syntactic structures
and knowledge. An interpretation is a pair 〈∆, .I〉, where ∆ is a domain of elements
that admits naive set theory and .I is a mapping function that maps individuals into
domain elements in ∆, concepts into sets in ∆ and operators into functions in ∆. The
mapping functions .I can be generalized into mapping from terms to elements.
Let I be an interpretation and a = b an assertion. We say that I is a model of
a = b, denoted by I |= a = b iff .I(a) = .I(b), also written aI = bI . Let KB be a
knowledge base. We say that I is a model of KB, denoted by I |= KB, iff I is a model
of every assertion in KB. We say that an assertion A is a property of KB, denoted by
KB |= A, iff for all interpretations I such that I |= KB, we have I |= A. In particular,
we say that an assertion A is a tautology iff it is modeled by all interpretations.
Since we assume naive set theory, we directly borrow some set theoretic constructs
on individuals, concepts and operators. For instance, we can use ∪(C1, C2) (also writ-
ten as C1∪C2) to denote a new concept that unions two concepts C1 and C2. Applying
this to assertions, we can see that assertions of the form (1) can indeed represent many
important features in knowledge representation. For instance, the membership asser-
tion, stating that an individual a is an instance of a concept C is the following assertion
∈ (a, C) = ⊤ (also written as a ∈ C). The containment assertion, stating that a con-
cept C1 is contained by another concept C2, is the following assertion⊆ (C1, C2) = ⊤
(also written as C1 ⊆ C2). The range declaration, stating that the range of an oper-
ator O operating on some concept C1 equals to another concept C2 is the following
assertion O(C1) = C2.
3 Definitions for Extensibility
The primitive form is a foundation that uses minimal assumed knowledge and primitive
constructs. Nevertheless, sometimes it is not convenient to use it for formalizing an
application domain, e.g., to represent logic expressions. Hence, we extend it with more
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building blocks. As discussed in the introduction section, extensibility is a critical issue
for KR approaches.
For this purpose, we introduce definitions in our approach. Definitions use (schema)
assertions to define new syntactic objects (individuals, concepts and operators) based
on existing ones. Note that definitions are nothing extra but special kinds of knowledge.
3.1 Defining individuals, operators and concepts
We start with defining new individuals. An individual definition is a special kind of
assertion of the form
a = t, (2)
where a is an atomic individual and t is a term. Here, a is the individual to be defined.
This assertion claims that the left side a is defined as the right side t. For instance,
0 = ∅ means that the individual 0 is defined as the empty set.
Defining new operators is similar to defining new individuals except that we use
schema assertions for this purpose. LetO be an operator to be defined and (C1, . . . , Cn)
its domain. An operator definition is a schema assertion of the form
O(C1, . . . , Cn) = T, (3)
where T is a schema term that mentions concepts only from C1, . . . , Cn. It could be
the case that T only mentions some of C1, . . . , Cn. Note that if C1, . . . , Cn refer to the
same concept, we need to use different copies respectively.
Since a schema assertion represents a set of assertions, essentially, an operator def-
inition of the form (3) defines the operator O by defining the value of O(a1, . . . , an)
one-by-one, where ai ∈ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Sometimes we also define operators in this
way. For instance, for defining the successor operator Succ, we can use the schema
assertion Succ(N) = {N, {N}}. This is equivalent to an alternative definition stat-
ing that, for every natural number n, the successor of n, is defined as {n, {n}}, i.e.,
Succ(n) = {n, {n}}. For instance, Succ(0) is defined as {∅, {∅}}.
Defining new concepts is different. As concepts are essentially sets, they are de-
fined through set theoretic constructions. We directly borrow set theory notations to
define concepts as follows:
Enumeration Let a1, . . . , an be n individuals. Then, the collection {a1, . . . , an} is a
concept, written as
C = {a1, . . . , an}. (4)
For instance, we can define the concept Digits by Digits = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}.
Operation Let C1 and C2 be two concepts. Then, C1 ∪ C2 (the union of C1 and
C2), C1 ∩ C2 (the intersection of C1 and C2), C1 \ C2 (the difference of C1 and C2),
C1×C2 (the Cartesian product of C1 and C2), 2C1 (the power set of C1) are concepts.
Operation can be written by assertions as well. For instance, the following assertion
C = C1 ∪ C2 (5)
states that the concept C is defined as the union of C1 and C2. As an example, one can
define the concept Man by Man = Human ∩Male.
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Comprehension Let C be a concept and A(C) a schema assertion that only mentions
concept C. Then, individuals in C satisfying A, denoted by {x ∈ C|A(x)} (or simply
C|A(C)), form a concept, written as
C′ = C|A(C). (6)
For instance, we can define the conceptMale by Male = {Animal |Sex(Animal) =
male}, meaning that Male consists of all animals whose sex are male.
Replacement Let O be an operator and C a concept on which O is well defined. Then,
the individuals mapped from C by O, denoted by {O(x) | x ∈ C} (or simply O(C)),
form a concept, written as
C′ = O(C). (7)
For instance, we can define the conceptParents byParents = ParentOf(Human),
meaning that it consists of all individuals who is a ParentOf some human.
Definitions can be incremental. We may define some syntactic objects first. Once
defined, they can be used to define more. One can always continue with this incre-
mental process to extend the current system. For instance, in arithmetic, we define the
successor operator first. Once defined, it can be used to define the add operator, which
is further served as a basis to define more and more useful syntactic objects.
For clarity, we use the symbol “::=” to replace “=” for definitions. We force
uniqueness of definitions. That is, each syntactic object can only be defined at most
once.
Another critical issue is about recursiveness. Clearly, a definition such as a ::=
a+ 1 is invalid and meaningless. Hence, we need to restrict our definitions. However,
sometimes we do use recursion to define concepts. For instance, in arithmetic, natural
numbers are define as N ::= {0} ∪ Succ(N), meaning that if n is a natural number,
then the successor of n, i.e. Succ(n), is also a natural number.
We require that recursion can only be used in replacement definition of concepts.
When a recursive replacement is used, we interpret it as an infinite process. At the
beginning, all concepts contain and only contain those individuals defined by non-
replacement definitions. Then, we apply the replacement definitions to obtain new
versions of concepts. This finishes the first step. We continue with the process. At
each step, we first use those non-replacement definitions to expand the concepts. Then,
again, we apply the replacement definitions to obtain new versions of concepts. This
could be an infinite process. For instance, consider the definition of natural numbers.
Initially, we have {0}. Then, applying the replacement definition, we expand it to
{0, Succ(0)}. We continue with this process to obtain the infinite set of natural num-
bers {0, Succ(0), Succ(Succ(0)), . . .}.
We require that all other definitions are non-recursive. Formally, the definition
dependency graph over a set of definitions (without replacements) is a directed graph
< V,E >, where V consists of all syntactic objects appeared in these definitions and
E is the set of all pairs (a, b) such that there exists a definition whose left side is a
and whose right side mentions b.2 A set of definitions is said to be non-recursive if its
corresponding definition dependency graph is acyclic.
2For operator definitions, we ignore the concepts that are arguments in the operator and in the schema
term since they are essentially grounded into individuals.
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In fact, one can observe that the Backus-Naur form (BNF), widely used in computer
science to define syntax, can be considered as a special case of our concept definitions
over strings. More precisely, BNF only uses three features, enumeration (of a single
element), union operation and recursive replacement by using the pre-assumed con-
catenation operator. Comprehension and other set operations are not used.
3.2 Multi-assertions
As a case study of extending the primitive form by definitions, we extend assertions of
the form (1) into multi-assertions.
Given a number n, we define a new operator Mn for multi-assertions with arity n
by the following schema assertion:
Mn(C1 = D1, . . . , Cn = Dn) ::= (C1, . . . , Cn) = (D1, . . . , Dn),
where Ci, Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are concepts of terms. This assertion states that for n
assertions, Assertioni, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, of the form (1), namely ai = bi, Mn(a1 =
b1, . . . , an = bn) is (a1, . . . , an) = (b1, . . . , bn). Hence, Mn(a1 = b1, . . . , an = bn)
holds if and only if for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai = bi, that is, Assertioni holds. In this sense,
this single assertion can be used to represent n assertions Assertioni, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Then, we define the concept of multi-assertions as follows:
Multi−Assertion ::=
⋃
1≤i≤∞
Mi(A
1, . . . ,Ai),
whereA1, . . . ,Ai are i copies of standard assertions. For convenience, we useAssertion1, . . . , Assertionn
to denote a n-ary multi-assertion.
Note that multiple assertions are just syntactic sugar of the primitive form as they
can be defined in the primitive form by using ordered pairs and Cartesian products.
In this sense, they do not increase the expressive power of the primitive form. Never-
theless, using them can make the representation task more convenient in some cases.
Multi-assertions are not only of interests themselves. Once defined, they can be used to
define more syntactic building blocks. Note that finite knowledge bases are finite sets of
assertions, i.e., multi-assertions, which can essentially be viewed as single assertions.
3.3 Nested terms and assertions
We continue with our extensions for the primitive form by introducing nested terms
and nested assertions. Note that terms defined in Section 2 cannot be nested in the
sense that individuals used inside an operator must be atomic. This can be generalized
to nested terms, where operators can use compound individuals inside.
Nested terms are defined by the following definition:
Nested− Term ::= Term ∪N − Term
N − Term ::= Op(Nested− Term),
where Term is the concept of standard term defined in Section 2, Op is an arbitrary
operator and Op(Nest − Term) is a replacement definition such that individuals in
Nest− Term are in the domain of Op.
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The above definition is a recursive definition. In fact, it can be simplified as
Nested− Term ::= Term ∪Op(Nested− Term).
However, this definition itself uses nested terms as well since Op(Nested− Term) is
not atomic. Hence, before formally defining the meaning of nested terms, we use the
former.
Nevertheless, from this example, we can see how to interpret nested terms. That
is, whenever a nested term is used, we introduce a new atomic individual to replace it,
and claim that this atomic individual defines the nested term. To formalize this idea,
we also need nested assertions, in which terms used on both sides of the assertion can
be nested.
Nested−Assertion ::= Nested− Term = Nested− Term.
As mentioned, nested assertions can be represented by non-nested multi-assertions
by introducing new individuals. Whenever a result of nested term is used, we introduce
a new individual to replace it and claim that this new individual is defined as the nested
term. That is, for every nested term Op(a1, . . . , Op′(b1, . . . , bm), . . . , am) occurred
in a nested assertion, we introduce a new atomic individual a′; replace the above term
with Op(a1, . . . , a′, . . . , am) and add a new assertion a′ = Op′(b1, . . . , bm). F(or
instance, the nested assertionOp(a,Op(b, Op′(c))) = Op′(d) is defined as Op(a, x) =
Op′(d), x = Op(b, y), y = Op′(c), where x and y are new individuals. In this sense,
nested assertion is essentially a multi-assertion, which can be represented as a single
assertion. Therefore, nested assertion is a syntactic sugar of the primitive form as well.
Using nested assertions can simplify the representation task. However, one can-
not overuse nested assertions since, essentially, every use of a nested term introduces
a new individual. For instance, one can easily get lost with a nested assertion like
Op(a,Op(b, Op′(c))) = Op′(d).
4 Logic Operators over Assertions
In this section, we continue to extend the primitive form with logic operators over
assertions. Interestingly, we can define not only propositional connectives but also
quantifiers based on naive set theory. This, on one side, provides another case study
how to extend the primitive form, and on the other side, shows that, assuming naive set
theory, the primitive form is expressive enough to capture logic.
4.1 Propositional operators over assertions
We start with the propositional case. Let A be the concept of nested assertions. We
introduce a number of operators over A, including ¬(A) (for negation), ∧(A1,A2)
(for conjunction), ∨(A1,A2) (for disjunction), → (A1,A2) (for implication) and ≡
(A1,A2) (for equivalence).
There could be different ways to define those operators, depending on which oper-
ators are defined directly and which are defined based on the previous ones. Here, we
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directly define negation, conjunction, disjunction and implication and indirectly define
equivalence.
Let a = a′ and b = b′ be two (nested) assertions. The propositional connectives
are defined as follows:
¬(a = a′) ::= {a} ∩ {a′} = ∅
∧(a = a′, b = b′) ::= ({a} ∩ {a′}) ∪ ({b} ∩ {b′}) = {a, a′, b, b′}
∨(a = a′, b = b′) ::= ({a} ∩ {a′}) ∪ ({b} ∩ {b′}) 6= ∅
→ (a = a′, b = b′) ::= ({a, a′} \ {a} ∩ {a′}) ∪ ({b} ∩ {b′}) 6= ∅
≡ (a = a′, b = b′) ::= ∧ (→ (a = a′, b = b′),→ (b = b′, a = a′)).
We also use a 6= a′ to denote ¬(a = a′). One can observe that the ranges of all
logic operators are nested assertions. Hence, similar to multi- and nested assertions,
propositional logic operators are syntactic sugar as well.
Now we consider some properties. For instance, according to the definitions, De-
Morgan’s laws are tautologies.
Theorem 1. Let A1 and A2 be two (nested) assertions. Then, for all interpretations I ,
I |= ¬(A1 ∨ A2) ≡ ¬(A1) ∧ ¬(A2).
I |= ¬(A1 ∧ A2) ≡ ¬(A1) ∨ ¬(A2).
Also, the relationship between implication and disjunction, i.e., A1 → A2 ≡ ¬A1∨
A2, is a tautology as well.
In fact, all tautologies in propositional logic are tautologies under our context, i.e.,
modeled by all interpretations, and vice versa. This, actually follows from the follow-
ing theorem, stating that the syntactic definitions above defines the semantics of logic
operators.
Theorem 2. Let A1 and A2 be two nested assertions. Then, for all interpretations I ,
• I |= ¬(A1) iff I is not a model of A1.
• I |= ∧(A1, A2) iff I is a model of both A1 and A2.
• I |= ∨(A1, A2) iff I is a model of either A1 or A2.
• I |=→ (A1, A2) iff I is a model of A1 implies that I is a model of A2.
• I |=≡ (A1, A2) iff I is a model of A1 if and only if I is a model of A2.
4.2 Quantifiers over assertions
Now we consider quantifiers, including ∀ (for the universal quantifier) and ∃ (for the
existential quantifier). The domain of quantifiers is a pair (C,A(C)), where C is a
concept and A(C) is a schema assertion that only mentions C.
The quantifiers are defines as follows:
∀(C,A(C)) ::= C|A(C) = C
∃(C,A(C)) ::= C|A(C) 6= ∅
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Intuitively, ∀(C,A(C)) is true iff those individuals x in C such that A(x) holds equals
to the concept C itself, that is, for all individuals x in C, A(x) holds; ∃(C,A(C)) is
true iff those individuals x in C such that A(x) holds does not equal to the empty set,
that is, there exists at least one individual x in C such that A(x) holds. We can see
that the ranges of quantifiers are nested assertions as well. Thus, quantifiers are also
syntactic sugar of the primitive form.
Similarly, the syntactic definitions of quantifiers based on naive set theory capture
their semantics.
Theorem 3. Let C be a concept and A(C) a schema assertion that only mentions C.
For all interpretations I ,
• I |= ∀(C,A(C)) iff for all individuals a in C, I |= A(a).
• I |= ∃(C,A(C)) iff there exists at least one individual a in C such that I |=
A(a).
As a consequence, one can prove some properties about quantifiers. For instance,
the universal quantifiers and the existential quantifiers are dual under negation.
Note that quantifiers defined here are ranging from an arbitrary concept C. If C
is a concept of all atomic individuals and all quantifiers range from the same concept
C, then these quantifiers are first-order. Nevertheless, the concepts could be different.
In this case, we have many-sorted first-order logic. Moreover, C could be complex
concepts, e.g., a concept of all possible concepts. In this case, we have monadic second-
order logic. Yet C could be many more, e.g., a concept of assertions, a concept of
concepts of terms etc. In this sense, the quantifiers become high-order.
5 Conclusions, Discussions and Related Work
In this paper, we have proposed a set theoretic approach to syntactically represent
knowledge in application domains. The syntax of a domain is captured by individ-
uals (i.e., objects in the domain), concepts (i.e., groups of objects sharing something
in common) and operators (i.e., connections and relationships among objects). From
a set theory point of view, individuals, concepts and operators are interpreted as ele-
ments, sets and functions respectively. In the primitive form, knowledge in the domain
is simply captured by equality assertions of the form a = b, where a and b are terms.
We have shown how to extend a system by definitions, which are special kinds of
knowledge used to define new individuals, concepts and operators. For instance, we
have extended the primitive form with multi-assertions and nested assertions, which are
just syntactic sugar of the primitive form as they can be expressed in it. Extensibility is
a critical issue for KR. A KR approach should be able to define new syntactic objects
based on exiting ones. Once defined, these objects can be further used to define more.
Interestingly, we have shown that logic operators, not only propositional connec-
tives but also quantifiers, can be defined in the primitive form based on naive set theory.
This, on one side, shows that we can define the semantics of logic operators syntacti-
cally, and on the other side, shows the expressiveness of our approach.
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As discussed in the introduction section, our motivation is to propose a simple, ex-
tensible, expressive and efficient KR approach. While extensibility and expressiveness
are discussed in the above two paragraphs, simplicity is difficult to justify. We argue
that our approach indeed satisfy the three aspects of simplicity. For primitiveness, our
approach only uses naive set theory, syntax including individuals, concepts and opera-
tors and knowledge of the form a = b. For succinctness, the primitive form only needs
at most double length to simulate logic, which is an arguably succinct KR formalism.
For user-friendliness, we believe that knowledge of the form a = b, similar to the as-
signment statement in programming, can be easily understood and used by knowledge
engineers.
Certainly, one can define multi-assertion, nested assertion and logic operators di-
rectly. Nevertheless, our motivation is to provide a simple foundation for knowledge
representation so that all other features and building blocks in KR can be defined as
extensions of it. We believe that our primitive form is such a candidate, evident from
the fact that it is able to capture high-order logic expressions.
This work has two philosophical implications. First, for answering the question
“what is knowledge”, our approach defines it as equality assertions between two terms.
Again, evident from the fact that single equality assertions can capture high-order logic
expressions based on naive set theory, we believe that it provides a uniformed view of
what knowledge is. Such a uniformed view is critical for not only understanding and
representing knowledge but also utilizing and reasoning about knowledge. Second, we
have shown that we can define the semantics of logic syntactically based on naive set
theory. We believe that the same thing can be done for the semantics of other features in
KR, e.g., nonmonotonic reasoning. This is useful as most operations done by machines
are syntax based.
This paper is mainly focused on the representation part. We leave the reasoning part
and the efficiency discussions to another paper. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning
a little here. Roughly speaking, reasoning is about how to derive properties from a
knowledge base. We distinguish between querying and reasoning. The former is to
check whether an assertion is a property of a knowledge base, while the latter is to find
some properties of a given knowledge base. Clearly, reasoning can serve as a means
for querying, but they are not the same. Querying is generally difficult of our approach
as it can express logic. Nevertheless, reasoning could be efficient, and that is exactly
the focus of our reasoning paper.
Although querying the full language is generally undecidable, there could be some
meaningful and useful tractable subclasses. An important case is database. Note again
that, in the primitive form, knowledge is simply formalized by equality assertions of the
form a = b. Nevertheless, this can be indeed expressive as a and b could be complex
nested terms. A database under our context only contains two kinds of equality asser-
tions, i.e., data of the form Op(a1, . . . , an) = b, where ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and b are atomic
individuals and membership statements a ∈ C, where a is an atomic individual and C
is an atomic concept. In this sense, data is a special kind of knowledge. Querying on
such a database is tractable. We leave the detailed discussions to another work.
Our set theoretic KR approach is deeply inspired by and rooted in many other
KR formalisms, including propositional and first-order logic, semantic network and
description logic. The dynamic version of this approach (will be presented in another
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paper) is deeply related to rule based formalisms including Hoare logic and answer
set programming. Interestingly, although originated from a different motivation, our
approach shares many basic ideas and borrows many notations from description logic
[Baader et al., 2003]. In fact, we can rewrite all building blocks in description logic
to our approach since the primitive form can capture first-order logic. Table 1 depicts
some of them. Here, Rˆ is defined to transform a binary Boolean relationship R to a
Table 1: Rewriting description logic into our approach
Constructs Description logic Our approach
individual individual individual
concept concept concept
role Role binary Boolean operator
intersection C ⊓D C ∩D
union C ⊔D C ∪D
complement ¬C I \ C
reverse role R− R−(C,D) ::= R(D,C)
existential restriction ∃R.C I|R̂−(I) ∩ C 6= ∅
universal restriction ∀R.C I|R̂−(I) ⊆ C
at least restriction ≥ nR.C I|(R̂−(I) ∩ C)C ≥ n
nominal {a} {a}
concept assertion C(a) a ∈ C
role assertion R(a, b) R(a, b)
individual equality a ≈ b a = b
concept inclusion C ⊑ D C ⊆ D
unary operator, i.e., Rˆ(C) ::= D|R(C,D), and (D)C denotes the cardinality of D.
Nevertheless, our approach differs from description logic in several essential ways.
The most important difference is that, for the purpose of forming new concepts by
operators/roles, our approach directly uses set theoretic constructs including compre-
hension and replacement, while description logics use role restrictions. As an example,
suppose that we want to specify a concept including all human having female children.
In our approach, this is formalized by Human | Children(Human)∩Female 6= ∅,
while in description logic, it is formalized by ∃Parentof.(Female). Secondly, we
use multi-ary operators, e.g., the Add operator, instead of binary Boolean relationships
to connect individuals/concepts. Thirdly, all knowledge in our approach are essentially
formalized in the same form, i.e., equality assertions. Fourthly, we allow complex as-
sertions including high-order constructs. Last but not least, we particularly highlight
the importance of extensibility in our approach.
We shall present a series of papers to propose the set theoretic knowledge repre-
sentation approach. This paper is a foundation that is mainly concerned with the basic
ideas and the representation part. As mentioned, there are a number of things to present
in the future. One critical task is to present the reasoning part. Another one is to formal-
ize dynamics, including how to represent basic and compound actions, how to describe
the effects of actions and the interactions among knowledge and actions.
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